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Abstract
In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the
problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequential decision problem.
In each step of the process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are
required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined
as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is
reinterpreted as a set of sequentially compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced
game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the
intersection of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to
the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally,
we analyze advantageous properties for the first player.
Resum
Dins el context de jocs cooperatius i problemes de repartiment de guanys, l’article proposa
realitzar aquest repartiment de forma sequ¨encial, on el pagament a cada jugador s’assigna
un darrera l’altre i seguint un ordre. El proce´s consisteix a fixar successivament, a cada
pas del proce´s, una fita inferior i superior que delimiten el possible pagament al jugador
analitzat, i a ”reduir” el joc un cop assignat el pagament al jugador. Els pagaments
sequ¨encialment compatibles so´n aquells que compleixen aquestes fites definides de forma
recurrent. El nucli del joc es reinterpreta aleshores com el conjunt de pagament sequ¨encials
compatibles amb la reduccio´ del joc a` la Davis-Maschler. Independentment del tipus de
reduccio´ utilitzat, el nucli e´s exactament la interseccio´ de tota la famı´lia de conjunts
de pagaments sequ¨encialment compatibles relatius als diferents ordres possibles (Th.2).
D’aquesta manera diem que el nucli e´s independent de l’ordre. Finalment, a l’article
s’analitza les avantatges del jugador que figura en primer lloc en l’ordre fixat.
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1 Introduction
One of the main goals of cooperative game theory is to describe fair methods for allocating
the joint profit arising from cooperation between agents. A preliminary normative task
of the theory is to describe the possible allocation vectors according to criteria related to
equity or justice: that is the core, the bargaining sets or the stable sets. All these solu-
tions propose distributions that may be accepted simultaneously by all players. However,
sometimes decisions regarding payoff allocations are not taken as a one-shot decision but
as a sequence of decisions. In this study we introduce the idea of sequential payoffs in
set-solutions defined for transferable utility cooperative games (TU-games).
The concept of a sequential payoff scheme has already been used in the analysis of
point-solutions for TU-games. A first analysis was given implicitly by Shapley (1972),
who introduced the value for cooperative games, which is the average of all the marginal
worth vectors. These vectors are usually interpreted as sequential payoffs in which each
player receives his marginal contribution to the set of predecessors with respect to a fixed
order given on the player set. Therefore, as in the Shapley value, the sequential analysis
can help to propose and analyze solutions for the cases where there is no apparent reason
to discriminate players. At this point it is interesting to mention the reduced marginal
worth vectors introduced by Nu´n˜ez and Rafels (1998), where the marginal contributions
of the players are evaluated with respect to successive reduced games.
In some models, cooperation must take into account a certain order of
players. One direction of the analysis comes when the cooperative phenomenon is per-
formed sequentially in time. This approach can be viewed as a source of sequentiality and
has been considered as an argument in the discussion of the concepts of recursive core
(Becker and Chakrabarti, 1995), sequential core (Gale, 1978, 1982) and strong sequential
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core (Predtetchinski et al., 2002).
In our approach the allocation decision problem will be performed step by step, with
players taking part in a natural sequential way. This point of view is closely related to the
recent works of Moulin (2000) and Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999). Moulin (2000) studies
in depth priority rules and other asymmetric methods for rationing problems. His work
is mainly devoted to the study and axiomatization of point-solutions for special problems
which have their translation into the class of cooperative TU-games. From his work it
is clear that the term sequentiality gives far from a unique outcome, so sequential set-
solutions should then be introduced. Potters and Sudho¨lter focus on the airport cost
games and the axiomatization of point-solutions. In their analysis, sequentiality appears
implicitly as the criterion for determining the payoff to the first player and the iterative
application of consistency determines the whole payoff vector.
The central idea of sequentiality we present in this paper relies on three main aspects.
The first one is that the assignment process is made following an order and so, whenever
we analyze the payoff of some player, we know the payoff of his predecessors and, more
importantly, we do not need to know at that moment the payoff of the players who follow
him.
Second, at each step of the process the payoff to the current player is chosen between
some upper and lower bounds. The upper bound will be a marginal contribution of the
player and the lower bound will be his individual worth of a suitable reduced game.
Third, each time a payoff to a player is accepted (i.e. if it passes the reasonability
test), and before the next player in the list is analyzed, the worth of coalitions “still in
the game” are reevaluated according to the already fixed payoffs; technically we say that
we reduce the game. At this point we note that for the reduction operator we will adopt
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the α-max generic reduction inspired in the works of Thomson (1990, 1996) who analyzes
(weak) consistency properties of solutions. These three aspects will comprise the concept
of the set of sequentially compatible payoffs with respect to an order.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the core from a sequential
point of view and reinterpret it as a set of sequentially compatible payoffs when the Davis
and Maschler reduction method is adopted. In Section 3, we define the main concept
of the paper, the set of sequentially compatible payoffs with respect to an order on the
set of players, which turns out to be a compact polyhedron in between the core and the
imputation set. Hence, for some selection of the reduced game, the set of sequentially
compatible payoffs may be an alternative whenever the core of the game is empty. In
section 4 we present our main results. The first result (Theorem 1) states that under
the Davis and Maschler reduction, all the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs coincide
with the core regardless of the prescribed order on the player set we fix. This result
by itself can be viewed as a new description for the classical core concept. The second
result (Theorem 2) states that for any arbitrary α-max reduction the intersection of all
the sequentially compatible payoff sets depending on the orders on the players is always
the core of the original game. This result has an interesting consequence since it states
that only the core is order-independent (Corollary 2). The third result (Theorem 3) aims
to solve a natural but dual question: which allocations can be supported by a sequential
argument? Curiously, we will see that any imputation can be supported in this way
if the game is totally balanced. In Section 5 we will analyze advantage properties for
players depending on their positions in the order, and finally, in Section 6 we present
some concluding remarks.
Before starting the analysis, let us establish our notation. By the set of natural
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numbers N we will denote the universe of potential players. By N ⊆ N we will denote a
finite set of players, in general N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any coalition S ⊆ N , |S| represents
its cardinality and 2N the power set of N . The symbol S ⊂ T is used for the strict
inclusion, i.e. S ⊆ T and S 6= T .
A cooperative game with transferable utility is a pair (N, v) where v : 2N −→ R,
with v(∅) = 0, is the characteristic function of the game. If no confusion arises we will
denote a cooperative TU-game by its characteristic function v and GN will be the set of
all cooperative TU-games on N . Given ∅ 6= S ⊆ N and v ∈ GN , vS will represent the
subgame which results of the characteristic function to the subsets of S.
Let RS, ∅ 6= S ⊆ N stand for the real-valued linear space of vectors, x = (xi)i∈S.
Given x ∈ RN and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N , x(S) :=∑i∈S xi and x|S := (xi)i∈S. We assume x(∅) = 0.
Let I∗(N, v) := {x ∈ RN | x(N) = v(N)} be the set of efficient vectors, also called
preimputations, and I(N, v) := {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | xi ≥ v({i}) for i = 1, . . . , n} be the set of
imputations of the game. We will denote by C(N, v) the core of the game v ∈ GN defined
by C(N, v) := {x ∈ I(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
A game with a non-empty core is called balanced and, if the game and all its subgames
have non-empty core, the game is called totally balanced.
2 Reviewing the core
The idea behind the core of a game is to distribute the total profit by trying at least to
satisfy the justified demands of any potential subcoalitions of players. Another point of
view - in fact historically the first one - was given by Gillies (1959) who defined the core as
the set of undominated preimputations (for more details see also Rafels and Tijs, 1997).
In this section we will give another interpretation based on sequential payments.
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To fix ideas, let us suppose that v ∈ GN and we fix an ordering of players in N ,
denoted by σ = (i1, i2, . . . , in), to implement the sequentiality process. Hence i1 is the
first player, i2 is the second player and so on. Let us now take a distribution in the core
of the game, say x ∈ C(N, v). By definition of the core, it holds that the payoff of any
player, and in particular the payoff of player i1, is between his individual worth and his
marginal contribution to the grand coalition. Formally,
v({i1}) ≤ xi1 ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i1}). (1)
Notice that these bounds also hold for the rest of players but could be
sharpened if the payoff for player i1 had been announced in advance. If this happens,
the reference game to establish these bounds is not the original game but what is known
as the reduced game.
Since the payoff for some players is fixed (we say that these players are in fact out
of the game), reducing the game means that players who are still in the game reevaluate
their worth by taking into account not only potential subcoalitions with each other, but
also coalitions that might include players out of the game, and bearing in mind that these
players will claim what they have been promised.
The first system of reduction was introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965). Suppose
players in T ⊂ N are still in the game and players in N \ T are out of the game, as they
have been assigned the payoff given by the components of the vector x ∈ RN . Then, the
reduced game on T at x is defined as
rTx (v)(S) := max
Q∈2N\T
{v(S ∪Q)− x(Q)} (2)
for all ∅ 6= S ⊂ T , with rTx (v)(∅) := 0 and rTx (v)(T ) := v(N) − x(N \ T ). This last
equality means that the amount to be distributed is exactly what is left by the players
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who are out of the game.
Peleg (1986) characterized the core axiomatically using, among other properties, a
consistency axiom. The standard consistency property says that for any ∅ 6= T ⊆ N , if
x ∈ C(N, v), it should hold x|T ∈ C(T, rTx (v)). If T = N \ {i1} we have
x|N\{i1} ∈ C(N \ {i1}, rN\{i1}x (v)). (3)
Once again, by the definition of the core, it holds that
rN\{i1}x (v)({i2}) ≤ xi2 ≤ rN\{i1}x (v)(N \ {i1})− rN\{i1}x (v)(N \ {i1, i2}). (4)
Repeating the reduction process, it is easy to check that, for any fixed order σ =
(i1, i2, . . . , in), any core element x ∈ C(N, v) meets the following inequalities:
v({i1}) ≤ xi1 ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i1}),
r
N\{i1}
x (v)({i2}) ≤ xi2 ≤ rN\{i1}x (v)(N \ {i1})− rN\{i1}x (v)(N \ {i1, i2}),
r
N\{i1, i2}
x (v)({i3}) ≤ xi3 ≤ rN\{i1, i2}x (v)(N \ {i1, i2})
− rN\{i1, i2}x (v)(N \ {i1, i2, i3}),
...
r
{in}
x (v)({in}) ≤ xin ≤ r{in}x (v)({in})− r{in}x (v)(∅).
(5)
Notice that the payoff to the players and their bounds are obtained sequentially start-
ing from the original game and following the reduction process as soon as players are
given their payoff. As we will see in Theorem 1, all inequalities in (5) are necessary and
sufficient to recover the core.
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3 The set of sequentially compatible payoffs
From the above interpretation of the core, a sequential payoff scheme will consist of an
iterative process where the cooperative game is reduced each time the payoff to a player is
assigned. The Davis and Maschler reduced game makes sense when it is plausible to take
into account all coalitions of players. However, in some situations it would be interesting
to incorporate other possibilities or restrictions in the model. For example, imagine that
the set of predecessors to a given player acts as a block. In this case, when we reduce the
game a dichotomous situation will appear: a coalition can go alone or join with all the
predecessors, but not with a subgroup, paying them their corresponding payoffs. Another
possibility is to think on an unfavoured set of agents N∗ ⊆ N such that we only want
to cooperate with those predecessors belonging to this group. This and other interesting
possibilities can be found in Elster (1992).
Our model will incorporate this kind of exogenous information by just allowing for a
more general family of reduced games than the original one given by Davis and Maschler.
This will be done by using the concept of admissible subgroup correspondence inspired in
the works of Thomson (1990, 1996).
Definition 1 Let α : 2N −→ 2N be a correspondence associating to every subset Q ⊆ N a
list of subgroups of Q. Then, we say that α is an admissible subgroup correspondence
on N if and only if, for any Q ⊆ N , we have α(Q) ⊆ 2Q where ∅ ∈ α(Q).
The interpretation of α(Q) ⊆ 2Q, for Q ⊆ N , is that it lists the admissible coalitions
of Q. This is the main reason for justifying that the empty set is always an admissible
coalition. We shall denote byA the set of all admissible subgroup correspondences. Notice
that we can define a partial order in A by means of the natural order inclusion. Formally,
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given α and α′ in A, we say that α ≤ α′ if and only if, for all Q ⊆ N , α(Q) ⊆ α′(Q).
The admissible subgroup correspondence will be used (see Definition 2) when a subset
N \T of players, T ⊂ N , has been paid, and then α(N \T ) will describe which coalitions
of N \ T are admissible to join players of T .
Associated to any admissible subgroup correspondence we can introduce the corre-
sponding α-max reduction, which is no more than the reduced game a` la Davis and
Maschler but taking into account the information given by the correspondence α.
Definition 2 Let v ∈ GN , α ∈ A, x ∈ RN and ∅ 6= T ⊂ N . The α-max reduced
game relative to T at x is defined as the cooperative game (T, rT,αx (v)) where
rT,αx (v)(S) :=

0 if S = ∅,
max
Q∈α(N\T )
{v(S ∪Q)− x(Q)} if ∅ 6= S ⊂ T,
v(N)− x(N\T ) if S = T.
The interpretation is that, given a payoff vector x ∈ RN , the worth of a coalition S in
the α-max reduced game relative to T at x, ∅ 6= T ⊂ N , is evaluated under the assumption
that S can ensure the cooperation of any admissible subgroup Q not overlapping with
T , Q ∈ α(N\T ), provided that each member of Q receives his original payoff given by
the vector x. The worth of a proper coalition S, S 6= ∅, will be the largest net worth
v(S ∪Q)− x(Q) for some admissible coalition Q.
Notice that the classical Davis and Maschler reduced game is a particular case when
we take α(Q) = 2Q, for all Q ⊆ N , as an admissible subgroup correspondence. We
denote this admissible subgroup correspondence by αDM and, if no confusion arises, we
will maintain the standard notation rTx (v) instead of r
T,αDM
x (v).
The minimal admissible subgroup correspondence is α(Q) = ∅, for all Q ⊆ N . Hence,
the associated α-max reduced game is the subgame except, eventually, for the efficiency;
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following Thomson (1996) we will name it projected reduced game. We denote this admis-
sible subgroup correspondence by αP . Notice that, αP ≤ α ≤ αDM , for all α ∈ A.
Example 1 Dichotomous reduction. This reduction is defined by
αd(Q) = {∅, Q}, for all Q ⊆ N.
It explains the idea that any coalition may stand alone or join with the whole group
of players Q. The corresponding αd-max reduced game was already used in Nu´n˜ez and
Rafels (1998) to analyze consistency properties for the extreme core points.
Example 2 N∗-reduction. The argument of this reduction relies on the possibility that,
prior to the game, it should be plausible to select some of the agents as a fixed reference
admissible group. Formally, let N∗ ⊆ N be an arbitrary subset of N = {1, . . . , n}. The
admissible subgroup correspondence associated to N∗ is defined by
αN∗(Q) := 2
Q∩N∗ , for all Q ⊆ N.
Notice that when N∗ = N we obtain αN = αDM and for N∗ = ∅ we have α∅ = αP .
Other examples of admissible subgroup correspondences can be given by taking into
account several important aspects of the coordination of players: communication, hierar-
chies, geographical areas, or the size of the subgroups.
Now we can define formally what we understand by a sequential cooperative problem.
Definition 3 A sequential cooperative problem is a four-tuple (N, v, α, σ), where (N, v)
is a cooperative game, α is an admissible subgroup correspondence on N and σ is an
arbitrary order on the player set N .
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An order σ = (i1, . . . , in) on the player set N where, |N | = n, is a bijection from
{1, . . . , n} to N . From now on, we will interpret σ as follows: σ(1) = i1 means that player
i1 is the first player, σ(2) = i2 means that player i2 is the second player, and so on. We
will denote by SN the set of all orderings on N . Given σ = (i1, . . . , in) we define the set of
predecessors of player ik ∈ N with respect to σ by P σk := {i1, . . . , ik−1} where k = 2, . . . , n,
and P σ1 := ∅. By F σk := {ik, ik+1, . . . , in}, for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we will denote the set of
followers of player ik in N , including ik, with respect to σ. Notice that F
σ
k = N\P σk for
any k = 1, . . . , n.
Finally, we can define the set of sequentially compatible payoffs. Notice that the
definition is no more than a recursive method that imposes at each step the marginal
bounds to the payoffs of players.
Definition 4 Let (N, v, α, σ) be an arbitrary sequential cooperative problem. The set of
sequentially compatible payoffs with respect to σ, denoted by SCσα(N, v), is the set of
vectors x ∈ RN such that
r
Fσk ,α
x (v)({ik}) ≤ xik ≤ rF
σ
k ,α
x (v)(F
σ
k )− rF
σ
k ,α
x (v)(F
σ
k \{ik}),
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Notice that for the first player i1 we just require that
v({i1}) ≤ xi1 ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i1}),
which can be justified by a stand-alone principle and a non-subsidy principle (Moulin,
1988) since the final allocation will be efficient (see the proof of Proposition 1). After
this, the game is reduced and the same two criteria are applied for the rest of the players.
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We will now look for a new expression of the set of sequentially compatible payoffs in
terms of linear inequalities, similar to the classical expression of the core. To do this we
will need to associate a hypergraph (Berge, 1973) to any sequential cooperative problem.
Definition 5 Let α be an admissible subgroup correspondence on N and σ ∈ SN . We
define the sequential hypergraph Hσα ⊆ 2N as
Hσα := {{ik} ∪Q, F σk+1 ∪Q for all Q ∈ α(P σk ), k = 1, . . . , n− 1}.
The sequential hypergraph is formed by the union of any admissible coalition Q of the
set of predecessors of an arbitrary player ik, Q ∈ α(P σk ), and the corresponding player
{ik} or all his strict followers, F σk+1.
As an illustration, the reader may check that if we take the projected reduction α = αP ,
then for any σ = (i1, . . . , in) its sequential hypergraph is formed by all the individual coali-
tions and the chains formed by deleting players following the order given by σ. Formally,
HσαP = {{ik}, {ik+1, . . . , in} | k = 1, . . . , n− 1}. (6)
In general Hσα will select some special coalitions of N . Let us point out that all the
individual coalitions will belong to Hσα for any α ∈ A and any σ ∈ SN , since we have
imposed ∅ ∈ α(Q) for any Q ⊆ N and α ∈ A. The relevance of the above hypergraph is
given in the next proposition.
Proposition 1 For any sequential cooperative problem (N, v, α, σ), the set of sequentially
compatible payoffs is
SCσα(N, v) = {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ Hσα}.
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Moreover, the set of sequentially compatible payoffs is a compact and convex polyhedral
set satisfying
C(N, v) ⊆ SCσα(N, v) ⊆ I(N, v).
Proof: An allocation x belongs to SCσα(N, v) if and only if
r
Fσk ,α
x (v)({ik}) ≤ xik ≤ rF
σ
k ,α
x (v)(F
σ
k )− rF
σ
k ,α
x (v)(F
σ
k \{ik}) for all k = 1, . . . , n.
By using the expression of the α-max reduction, the above inequalities can be split
into
max
Q∈α(Pσk )
{v({ik} ∪Q)− x(Q)} ≤ xik and
xik ≤ v(N)− x(P σk )− max
Q∈α(Pσk )
{v(F σk+1 ∪Q)− x(Q)},
(7)
for k = 1, . . . , n− 1, and
rF
σ
n ,α
x (v)({in}) ≤ xin ≤ rF
σ
n ,α
x (v)(F
σ
n )− rF
σ
n ,α
x (v)(F
σ
n \{in}). (8)
Since F σn = {in}, we obtain F σn \{in} = ∅ and then xin = rF
σ
n ,α
x (v)({in}). Moreover, by
definition of the reduced game, r
Fσn ,α
x (v)({in}) = v(N) − x(N\{in}), and so inequalities
in (8) reduce to
xin = v(N)− x(N\{in}).
Therefore, any x ∈ SCσα(N, v) is efficient and then v(N)−x(P σk ) = x(F σk ) for 1 ≤ k <
n. Using this fact, (7) is equivalent to
max
Q∈α(Pσk )
{v({ik} ∪Q)− x(Q)} ≤ xik ≤ x(F σk )− max
Q∈α(Pσk )
{v(F σk+1 ∪Q)− x(Q)},
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for 1 ≤ k < n. The left hand inequalities for xik are equivalent to
x({ik} ∪Q) ≥ v({ik} ∪Q), for all Q ∈ α(P σk )
and the right hand ones to
x(F σk+1 ∪Q) ≥ v(F σk+1 ∪Q), for all Q ∈ α(P σk ).
Therefore, x ∈ SCσα(N, v) is equivalent to
SCσα(N, v) = {x ∈ I∗(N, v) | x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ Hσα}.
A direct consequence of the above equality is that the sequential core is a convex
polyhedral set which includes the classical core, C(N, v) ⊆ SCσα(N, v). To prove com-
pactness and that the imputation set includes the set of sequentially compatible payoffs,
we only have to take into account that the individual coalitions belong to the sequential
hypergraph, i.e. {ik} ∈ Hσα for any k = 1, . . . , n, α ∈ A and σ ∈ SN . 2
By this characterization, it is easy to find examples where the set of sequentially
compatible payoffs is empty. Nevertheless, notice that if the original game is balanced,
i.e. C(N, v) 6= ∅, then all sequentially compatible payoff sets are non-empty, whatever
α ∈ A and σ ∈ SN we fix.
Moreover, given two admissible subgroup correspondences α, α′ ∈ A, if they are com-
parable, i.e. α ≤ α′, then for any order σ ∈ SN we have Hσα ⊆ Hσα′ , which implies
the corresponding reverse inclusion between the set of sequentially compatible payoffs,
SCσα′(N, v) ⊆ SCσα(N, v).
The above proposition also connects the set of sequentially compatible payoffs with
the work of Faigle (1989), which analyzed the case of games with restricted cooperation.
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From this connection it is easy to develop the Shapley-Bondareva algebraic conditions
that characterize the non-emptiness of a specific set of sequentially compatible payoffs. In
fact, we only need to work with balanced collections formed by coalitions on the sequential
hypergraph associated.
Remark 1 Notice that the definition of a sequentially compatible payoff set implies that,
at each step of the sequential analysis, we reduce the same n-player game v and the payoff
vector we start from is always x. Another intuitive approach to the sequential analysis
could be, at each step of the process, to reduce the reduced game obtained in the previous
step. This process involves a smaller and smaller set of players, and with respect to a
payoff vector with fewer and fewer coordinates. However, this approach turns out to be
just a particular case of the one we have adopted, which is the main reason for following
this approach.
4 The main results
Once we have introduced the concept of a set of sequentially compatible payoffs we will
look for its properties. First we will show that under the Davis and Maschler reduction
the set of sequentially compatible payoffs coincide with the core, regardless of the order
we fix on the player set.
Theorem 1 For any game v ∈ GN and any order σ on N , we have
C(N, v) = SCσαDM (N, v).
The proof is straightforward taking into account proposition 1 and the fact that, for
any σ = (i1, . . . , in), HσαDM = 2N\{∅, N}.
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The above result states an interesting order-independence of the set of sequentially
compatible payoffs if we use the Davis and Maschler reduced game. Nevertheless, this
property is lost when other reduced games are used (see corollary 2).
A consequence of the above theorem is a sort of recursive characterization of the core
that emphasizes an interesting feature of it, already stated by Driessen (1985).
Corollary 1 Let v ∈ GN , x ∈ RN , i ∈ N and T := N \ {i}. Then,
x ∈ C(N, v) ⇔
 v({i}) ≤ xi ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i}) andx|T ∈ C(T, rTx (v)),
where rTx (v) is the DM-reduced game relative to T at x.
Notice that from the above recursive result we obtain a way to analyze core-selection
solutions. Roughly speaking, first-player marginality plus first-player consistency implies
core selection. This fact was used by Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999) to analyze point-
solutions for the class of airport cost games.
Another consequence of Theorem 1 is that, in general, the bounds imposed in the
definition of the set SCσα(N, v), for any α ∈ A, are not always attainable. By Theorem
1, SCσαDM (N, v) = C(N, v) and it is well known that a balanced game may not attain the
individual worths of some players or/and their marginal contributions. Therefore, bounds
imposed in the definition of the sequentially compatible payoff set may not be attainable.
In particular, the initial bounds for the first player, v({i1}) ≤ xi1 ≤ v(N) − v(N \ {i1})
can be modified during the complete sequential analysis.
In addition, if we describe the inequalities of the set of sequentially compatible payoffs,
SCσαDM (N, v), we will obtain a complete description of the core by giving explicit inequali-
ties for the individual payoffs, xi, i ∈ N , only depending on the payoffs to the predecessors.
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First notice that, by Theorem 1, the core can be described, for any σ = (i1, . . . , in), as
those vectors x ∈ RN such that
r
Fσk
x (v)({ik}) ≤ xik ≤ rF
σ
k
x (v)(F
σ
k )− rF
σ
k
x (v)(F
σ
k \ {ik}),
for k = 1, . . . , n, where rTx (v) is the DM-reduced game on T at x. Hence, for any 1 ≤ k < n,
r
Fσk
x (v)({ik}) = max
Q∈2Pσk
{v({ik} ∪Q)− x(Q)} and
r
Fσk
x (v)(F σk )− rF
σ
k
x (v)(F σk \ {ik}) = v(N)− x(P σk )− max
Q∈2Pσk
{v(F σk+1 ∪Q)− x(Q)}
= min
Q∈2Pσk
{v(N)− v(F σk+1 ∪Q)− x(P σk \Q)},
and so we obtain a core description in terms of the efficient allocations that satisfy
max
Q∈2Pσk
{v({ik} ∪Q)− x(Q)} ≤ xik ≤ min
Q∈2Pσk
{v(N)− v(F σk+1 ∪Q)− x(P σk \Q)},
for k = 1, . . . , n− 1.
Let us point out that to limit the payoff to player ik, only the payoffs to his predecessors
are taken into account. As an illustrative example notice that for N = {1, 2, 3} and for
any σ = (i1, i2, i3) we are describing the core as those x ∈ RN such that
v({i1}) ≤ xi1 ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i1}),
max
 v({i2}),v({i1, i2})− xi1
 ≤ xi2 ≤ min
 v(N)− v(N \ {i2}),v(N)− v(N \ {i1, i2})− xi1

and xi3 = v(N)− xi1 − xi2 .
From this recursive description of the core it should be possible to introduce new point-
solution concepts: for example, the sequential point-solution assigning to the players a
half of their range in the core, or a fixed proportion of these ranges. We leave these
matters for future studies.
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As a second main result we will analyze the intersection of the different sequentially
compatible payoff sets corresponding to all possible orders on N . Therefore, we look
for those imputations which satisfy all possible sequentiality criteria, with the reduction
α ∈ A fixed. Obviously, by Theorem 1 the intersection mentioned above will coincide with
the core for the Davis and Maschler reduction since each of the sequentially compatible
payoff sets coincides with the core itself. The next theorem will show that this will always
be the case, whatever reduction α ∈ A we fix.
Theorem 2 For any cooperative game (N, v) and any α ∈ A, we have
⋂
σ∈SN
SCσα(N, v) = C(N, v).
Proof: By Proposition 1 we know that C(N, v) ⊆ ⋂σ∈SN SCσα(N, v). Let x ∈ ⋂
σ∈SN
SCσα(N, v)
be an arbitrary element of the intersection. Once again by Proposition 1, we know that
x ∈ I(N, v). In order to prove that x ∈ C(N, v), let S ⊆ N be an arbitrary sub-
coalition, |S| ≥ 2, S 6= ∅, N . Now take σ∗ ∈ SN where players in S enter the last
positions, i.e. σ∗ = (i1, . . . , in−s, in−s+1, . . . , in) and S = {in−s+1, . . . , in}. By hypothesis,
x ∈ SCσ∗α (N, v), which implies xin−s ≤ x(F σ∗n−s)−maxQ∈α(Pσ∗n−s){v(F σ
∗
n−s+1 ∪Q)− x(Q)}.
Since α ∈ A, we know that ∅ ∈ α(P σ∗n−s) and then xin−s ≤ x(F σ∗n−s) − v(F σ∗n−s+1), or,
equivalently, v(F σ
∗
n−s+1) ≤ x(F σ∗n−s+1), which implies that x ∈ C(N, v). 2
The above theorem also states that if we replace the Davis and Maschler reduction
by an arbitrary one, α ∈ A, the core C(N, v) splits into the family {SCσα(N, v)}σ∈SN .
Moreover, if we combine Theorem 1 and 2 we can obtain an interesting new feature of the
core: the core could be viewed as an order-independent sequentially compatible solution.
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Definition 6 Let α be an admissible subgroup correspondence on N . The set of sequen-
tially compatible payoffs is order-independent if
SCσα(N, v) = SC
σ′
α (N, v), for all v ∈ GN , and all σ, σ′ ∈ SN .
Corollary 2 The core is the only order-independent set of sequentially compatible payoffs.
Proof: By Theorem 1 we know that SCσαDM (N, v) = C(N, v) for any σ ∈ SN . Then let
us suppose that there exists α 6= αDM such that for any σ, σ′ ∈ SN , σ 6= σ′ it holds that
SCσα(N, v) = SC
σ′
α (N, v), and so
⋂
σ′∈SN SC
σ′
α (N, v) = SC
σ
α(N, v), for any σ ∈ SN . But
by Theorem 2, this intersection is the core of the game. 2
For the last result in this section we will study the behavior of the union of the
above family of sets. By Proposition 1, any set of sequentially compatible payoffs is a
subset of the imputation set of the original game. Therefore, fixing α ∈ A, we have⋃
σ∈SN SC
σ
α(N, v) ⊆ I(N, v). Moreover, since the projected reduction process satisfies
αP ≤ α, for any α ∈ A, we also know that
⋃
σ∈SN SC
σ
α(N, v) ⊆
⋃
σ∈SN SC
σ
αP
(N, v) ⊆
I(N, v), for any α ∈ A.
The last inclusion could be strict, as we will show later in an example, but in some
cases we will have an equality. The next theorem states that, for a relatively large class of
cooperative games, any imputation can be supported by a sequential approach by using
the projected reduction.
Theorem 3 Let (N, v) be a totally balanced game. Then, we have
⋃
σ∈SN
SCσαP (N, v) = I(N, v).
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Proof: By Proposition 1, ∪σ∈SNSCσαP (N, v) ⊆ I(N, v). For the reverse inclusion, first
notice that the totally-balancedness hypothesis implies
v(S) ≥ 1|S| − 1
∑
i∈S
v(S \ {i}), for all S ⊆ N with |S| ≥ 2. (9)
Then, let x ∈ I(N, v) and suppose that, for all i ∈ N , xi > v(N)−v(N\{i}). By efficiency,
v(N) > nv(N)−∑i∈N v(N\{i}) or, equivalently, ∑i∈N v(N\{i}) > (n− 1)v(N), which
contradicts (9). Therefore, there is a player i1 ∈ N such that v({i1}) ≤ xi1 ≤ v(N) −
v(N\{i1}). Now consider the αP -max reduced game relative to N\{i1} at x,
rN\{i1},αPx (v)(S) =

0 ifS = ∅,
v(S) if∅ 6= S ⊂ N\{i1},
v(N)− xi1 ifS = N\{i1}.
From the expression of this reduced game and (9), it is straightforward to check that
rN\{i1},αPx (v)(S) ≥
1
|S| − 1
∑
i∈S
rN\{i1},αPx (v)(S \ {i}), (10)
for all S ⊆ N \{i1} with |S| ≥ 2, as for S ⊂ N \{i1} the reduced game is just the subgame
and for S = N \ {i1}, since xi1 ≤ v(N)− v(N\{i1}), we get
v(N)− xi1 ≥ v(N\{i1}) ≥
1
n− 2
∑
i∈N\{i1}
v(N \ {i1, i})),
where the last inequality follows from (9). On the other hand, if x ∈ I(N, v), then
x|N\{i} ∈ I(N\{i}, rN\{i},αPx (v)). Hence, by repeating the above reasoning we know that
there is a player, say i2 ∈ N\{i1}, such that
rN\{i1},αPx (v)({i2}) ≤ xi2 ≤ rN\{i1},αPx (v)(N\{i1})− rN\{i1},αPx (v)(N\{i1, i2}).
Finally, following the same argument, and taking into account that the projected reduction
has the transitive property, i.e. for any game (N, v), all x ∈ RN and all ∅ 6= S ⊂ T ⊆ N ,
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| T |≥ 2,
rS,αPx|T (r
T,αP
x (v)) = r
S,αP
x (v),
we can find an order σ ∈ SN , with σ(1) = i1, σ(2) = i2, . . . , such that x ∈ SCσαP (N, v),
and the desired result is obtained. 2
The next example shows that the totally-balancedness condition of the game is not
necessary for obtaining the same result.
Example 3 Let (N, v) be the five-person balanced game defined by:
v({1, 2}) = v({3, 4}) = 5, v({1, 2, 5}) = v({3, 4, 5}) = 2.5
v({1, 2, 3}) = v({1, 2, 4}) = v({1, 3, 4}) = v({2, 3, 4}) = 6.5
v({1, 2, 3, 5}) = v({1, 2, 4, 5}) = v({1, 3, 4, 5}) = v({2, 3, 4, 5}) = 3,
v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 9, v(N) = 15 and v(S) = 0 for the other coalitions.
The game is not totally balanced because the subgame associated to S = {1, 2, 3, 4}
is not balanced (v({1, 2}) + v({3, 4}) = 10 > v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 9). However, it satisfies
condition (9) in the proof of the Theorem, which is sufficient to obtain equality between
the imputation set and the union of the sequentially compatible payoff sets.
To end this section, let us see an example where the union of the sequentially com-
patible payoff sets corresponding to the projected reduction does not coincide with the
imputation set.
Example 4 Let (N, v) be the symmetric four-person game where v({i}) = 0 for all
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, v({i, j}) = 100, v({i, j, k}) = 125 and v(N) = 180, for all i, j, k ∈ N =
{1, 2, 3, 4} such that i < j < k. The imputation (45, 45, 45, 45) 6∈ SCσαP (N, v) for any
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σ ∈ SN since for any pair of players we have xi + xj = 90 < v({i, j}) = 100 (see
Proposition 1).
5 First-player advantage property
From the above results we can see that if we use a notion of reduced game other than
the Davis and Maschler notion, i.e. α 6= αDM , α ∈ A, then the set SCσα(N, v) is order-
dependent. This leads us to look for advantage properties for players depending on their
positions in the order. To do this, let us first introduce some notation.
For a given order σ = (i1, . . . , in) and k = 2, . . . , n− 1 we will denote
σk = (i2, . . . , ik, i1, ik+1, . . . , in) and σ
n = (i2, i3, . . . , in, i1). The interpretation is clear:
σk, k = 2, . . . , n, represents switches in the position of the original first player in σ without
changing the sequence of the remaining players. We will identify σ with σ1 whenever it
is needed.
To analyze advantage properties for players depending on their positions we introduce,
as a criterion for comparing potential payoffs, the idea that players prefer more rather
than less. With this assumption in mind, let us associate to any sequential cooperative
problem (N, v, α, σ), with a non-empty sequential compatible payoff set what we call the
maximal sequential rule denoted by x¯σ,α(v) ∈ RN .
The maximal sequential rule x¯σ,α(v) ∈ RN can be described as follows: for all
k = 1, . . . , n,
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x¯σ,αik (v) = max
x ∈ SCσα(N, v)
xi1 = x¯
σ,α
i1
(v)
...
xik−1 = x¯
σ,α
ik−1(v)
{xik}. (11)
Notice that the first player in the given order σ = (i1, i2, . . . in) maximizes his potential
gains over the set of sequentially compatible payoffs. Then,
x¯σ,αi1 (v) = maxx∈SCσα(N,v)
{xi1}.
In his turn, the second player will maximize his payoff by taking into account that
xi1 = x¯
σ,α
i1
(v) for the first player. Then,
x¯σ,αi2 (v) = max
x ∈ SCσα(N, v)
xi1 = x¯
σ,α
i1
(v)
{xi2}.
We then repeat the process until we reach the last player. Notice that this last player
is in fact a payoff-taker agent: his payoff is just what is left by the rest of the players,
x¯σ,αin (v) = v(N)− (x¯σ,αi1 (v) + . . .+ x¯σ,αin−1(v)).
The maximal allocation rule is well-defined and it is easy to see that it is always an
extreme point of the compact polyhedron SCσα(N, v).
Moreover, the maximal sequential rule can be interpreted as a kind of
priority rule for the initial sequential cooperative problem (in some cases it will coin-
cide with a marginal worth vector, as we will see in the proof of Proposition 2).
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Definition 7 The α-max reduction, α ∈ A, has the first-player advantage property
for a given game v ∈ GN if for all σ = (i1, i2 . . . , in) and all k = 1, . . . , n we have :
1) SCσ
k
α (N, v) 6= ∅ and
2) x¯σ,αi1 (v) ≥ x¯σ
k,α
i1
(v).
If the reduction has this property, the first player does not have an incentive to move to
another position. Notice that x¯σ
k,α
i1
(v) is the maximum that player i1 could obtain by going
in position k ∈ {1, . . . , n} (after paying their corresponding maxima to his predecessors).
Remember at this point that if a game is balanced then all its sequentially compati-
ble payoff sets are non-empty, which implies that the above property can be checked, at
least, in a general class of games. Moreover, conditions weaker than balancedness can
also guarantee the non-emptiness of the sequentially compatible payoff set. The reader
may check that the condition v(S) +
∑
i∈N\S v({i}) ≤ v(N), for all S ⊆ N , is a neces-
sary and sufficient condition to guarantee the non-emptiness of all projected sequentially
compatible payoff sets.
As an example of reduction which has the first-player advantage property we have the
case of the Davis and Maschler reduction on the class of balanced games. This is a direct
consequence of theorem 1 and the justification is left to the reader.
On the other hand, the projected reduction does not in general have this advantage
property. To check this, let us take the following balanced and superadditive 3-player
game: v({1}) = v({2}) = v({3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = 3, v({2, 3}) = 5 and
v({1, 2, 3}) = 7. By Proposition 1 it is easy to check that, if σ = (1, 2, 3) then σ2 = (2, 1, 3)
and
SCσαP (N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) | x2 + x3 ≥ v({2, 3}) = 5}
and
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SCσ
2
αP
(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v) | x1 + x3 ≥ v({1, 3}) = 3}.
Therefore, x¯σαP (v) = (2, 5, 0) and x¯
σ2
αP
(v) = (3, 4, 0), which shows that the first player
i1 = 1 obtains an extra unit if he is so kind as to allow player 2 to be the first. Moreover,
this extra unit is taken from the payoff of the second player.
The negative result shown by this example could also be explained by the next propo-
sition. Recall that a game (N, v) is 0-monotonic if v(S) +
∑
i∈T\S v({i}) ≤ v(T ) for all
S ⊆ T ⊆ N .
Proposition 2 On the class of 0-monotonic cooperative games the following statements
are equivalent:
1) The projected reduction αP has the first-player advantage property.
2) For any player i ∈ N , v(N)− v(N \ {i}) ≥ max
S⊆N, i∈S
{v(S)− v(S \ {i})}.
Proof: By Proposition 1, it is easy to see that for α = αP and σ = (i1, i2, . . . , in),
SCσαP (N, v) =

x ∈ I(N, v) such that
xi2+ xi3+ . . .+ xin−1+ xin ≥ v({i2, . . . , in})
xi3+ . . .+ xin−1+ xin ≥ v({i3, . . . , in})
. . .
xin−1+ xin ≥ v({in−1, in})

. (12)
Moreover, if v ∈ GN is 0-monotonic, then SCσαP (N, v) 6= ∅ for any σ ∈ SN . This can be
explained as follows: for 0-monotonic games and for any order σ = (i1, i2, . . . , in), the vec-
tor zσ(v) ∈ RN defined as zσi1(v) = v(N)−v(N \{i1}), zσi2(v) = v(N \{i1})−v(N \{i1, i2}),
. . . , zσin(v) = v({in}) is an imputation of the game. Furthermore, looking at the descrip-
tion of the set of sequentially compatible payoffs (see (12)), it follows straightforwardly
that zσ(v) ∈ SCσαP (N, v) for any 0-monotonic game.
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We now that for a given σ ∈ SN , the vector zσ(v) is the maximal sequential rule,
i.e. x¯σ,αP (v) = zσ(v). Let us prove this. Since zσ(v) ∈ SCσαP (N, v), the maximum that
the first player can obtain in SCσαP (N, v) is x¯
σ,αP
i1
(v) = v(N) − v(N \ {i1}). Now, for
any x ∈ SCσαP (N, v) with xi1 = v(N) − v(N \ {i1}), we have xi2 + . . . + xin = v(N) −
(v(N)− v(N \ {i1})) = v({i2, . . . , in}). Since xi3 + . . . + xin ≥ v({i3, . . . , in}), we obtain
xi2 ≤ v({i2, . . . , in})− v({i3, . . . , in}). Finally, from the fact that zσ(v) ∈ SCσαP (N, v), we
have x¯σ,αPi2 (v) = v({i2, . . . , in})−v({i3, . . . , in}) = zσi2(v). With a similar argument for the
rest of players (we omit details) we finally see that x¯σ,αP (v) = zσ(v).
From the above facts, the equivalence stated in the proposition can be straightfor-
wardly deduced and it is left to the reader. 2
As a first consequence of this result we can state an interesting property for convex
games (Shapley, 1972).
Corollary 3 On the domain of convex games, any α-max reduction, α ∈ A, has the
first-player advantage property.
Proof: By Proposition 2, as convex games are 0-monotonic and satisfy condition 2) of
that proposition, the projected reduction αP has the first player advantage property for
this class of games. Moreover, as we have seen in the proof of Proposition 2 and given
an ordering σ = (i1, i2, . . . , in), the maximal sequential rule coincides with the vector
zσ(v) ∈ RN defined as zσi1(v) = v(N)− v(N \ {i1}), zσi2(v) = v(N \ {i1})− v(N \ {i1, i2}),
. . . , zσin(v) = v({in}). Moreover, this vector is just a vector of marginal contributions
of the game v so, as the game is convex, it belongs to its core (see Shapley, 1972), i.e.
zσ(v) ∈ C(N, v). Therefore, x¯σ,αP (v) = x¯σ,αDM (v) = zσ(v).
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Now, from the inclusion relation C(N, v) ⊆ SCσα(N, v) ⊆ SCσαP (N, v), we have x¯σ,α(v) =
zσ(v), for all α ∈ A and all σ ∈ SN . Finally, from the convexity of the game, it follows
that x¯σ,αi1 (v) ≥ x¯σ
k,α
i1
(v), and the proof is done. 2
For other classes of games, such as assignment games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972),
the first-player advantage property still holds if we impose an additional requirement to
the α-max reduction. In this sense, we say that α ∈ A is upper dichotomous if, for any
Q ⊆ N , Q ∈ α(Q), where the name comes from the fact that αd ≤ α. For instance, the
Davis-Maschler reduction is upper-dichotomous, but this is not the case of the projected
reduction.
Theorem 4 On the class of assignment games any upper-dichotomous reduction has the
first-player advantage property.
Proof: It is well known that, given an assignment game (N, v), for any player i ∈ N
there exists a payoff vector x in the core of the game such that xi = v(N) − v(N \ {i})
(the marginal contribution of player i is attained in the core, (see, for instance, Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990). As the core is in any set of sequentially compatible payoffs, i.e.
C(N, v) ⊆ SCσα(N, v) for any α ∈ A and σ ∈ SN , the marginal contribution of any player
i will also be attainable in any set of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to an
assignment game. This implies that, given an assignment game (N, v) and a fixed ordering
of players σ = (i1, i2, . . . , in), the maximal sequential rule will assign to player i1 at least
his marginal contribution. In fact, it will assign exactly the marginal contribution as it is
an upper bound in the definition of the set SCσα(N, v). Hence, x¯
σ,α
i1
(v) = v(N)−v(N\{i1}).
At this point, since α is upper-dichotomous and by the description of the set of sequen-
tially compatible payoffs given in Proposition 1, notice we have x(N \ {i}) ≥ v(N \ {i})
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for all x ∈ SCσα(N, v), σ ∈ SN and i ∈ N . Therefore, by efficiency, xi ≤ v(N)−v(N \{i})
for all i ∈ N . Hence, any movement of player i1 to other positions will not benefit him,
as x¯σ
k,α
i1
(v) ≤ v(N)− v(N \ {i1}) for all k = 2, . . . , n. 2
Notice that assignment games do not meet condition 2) of Proposition 2, so the pro-
jected reduction will not preserve the first-player advantage property in this class of games.
The next example shows this point.
Example 5 Let (N, v) be the assignment game associated to the assignment matrix
3 4
1
2
 4 5
1 3

where {1, 2} is the set of buyers and {3, 4} is the set of sellers. In this case v(N)− v(N \
{1}) = 7 − 3 = 4 and v({1, 4}) − v({4}) = 5. This implies that if we take the orderings
σ = (1, 2, 3, 4) and σ3 = (2, 3, 1, 4), we have x¯
σ,αp
1 (v) = 4 < x¯
σ3,αp
1 (v) = 5, where player
1 will take advantage to move to the third position.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied the problem of sequential allocation decisions. The set of sequen-
tially compatible payoffs describes which allocation vectors are accepted according to an
interative application, at each step of the process, of the stand-alone principle and the
non-subsidy principle.
This perspective opens up several lines of research. First of all, point-solution concepts
could be analyzed within this sequential analysis. In this sense, a sequential solution would
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be defined by a rule or a criterion that assigns payoffs to players following a fixed order.
In this paper, the sequential maximal rule is just one assymetric example of this kind of
solutions. Furthermore, from any assymetric rule, an associated rule can be derived by
taking the average of the assymetric solutions corresponding to the different orders. From
this perspective, not only could new solutions be defined but old well-known solutions
could be reviewed.
Secondly, the iterative process performed suggests a strategic analysis of a sequential
non-cooperative game in which players take decisions in the given order (to leave or not
to leave the game, to accept or not to accept a payoff). Are the equilibria of such a
game consistent with the set of sequentially compatible payoffs? Regarding this question
it is interesting to read the paper by Moldovanu and Winter (1995), which analyzes core
allocations by a dynamic process of payoff vector proposals.
Finally, a natural extension is to apply sequential analysis to the case of non-transferable
utility games. Several interesting questions then arise. For example, how does one de-
fine the iterative process and would the same general results still hold (in particular the
order-independence of the core)?
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